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Motivation	  
 
The overall motivation for this project stems from an interest in International Relations, and 
especially a more regional interest in the European Union. While there are many interesting 
elements within the European Union, our main sphere of interest lies with security and defence 
politics. From earlier projects on this subject, specifically concerning the United Nations and 
its United Nations Security Council, we have gained a lot of interesting angles. We are 
therefore curious about the development within the European Union, and interested in applying 
some of our knowledge and experience towards it. We have found it remarkable that such an 
institution suddenly strives have part in international security, and as such is developing its 
security and defence politics. With the new initiatives in the Lisbon treaty, it is interesting to 
see how its power and development has come to pass, as well as what that means for its global 
role.                        
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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
With the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951(Treaty of Paris 1951), shortly after 
the end of the WWII, parts of Europe was united with the goal of making war impossible 
between the Great Powers of Europe1 (Schuman Declaration 1950). However with the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) that introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as 
the idea for the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union is moving in an 
entirely new direction from making war impossible. The aim of this project is to account for 
the development of the European Union’s external security and defence sphere, both in terms 
of its structure but also in terms of what, if any, power this gives the European Union, as well 
as how this may change the global role of the European Union. 
	  
1.2	  Problem	  area 
	  
The European Union and its precursors have experienced a significant enlargement since its 
inception in 1951(Ec.europa.eu). These waves of enlargements however, have not been limited 
to the number of Member States, but also what competences its institutions have been entrusted 
with, as well as new institutions and positions created. With the inception of the Coal and Steel 
Community in 1952, its primary purpose was to increase the interdependence between the then 
member states though cooperation within the coal and steel industries, and as such decrease the 
chance of a militarized Europe, as envisioned in the Schuman Declaration (europa.eu, E). With 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome the European Economic Community was established (Treaty 
of Rome 1957), ushering in a period of economic integration. The creation of the European 
Union, in its current name, happened under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 , wherein there was 
an increased focus, in not only the economic and political aspects of the union, but a greater 
emphasis on collective security and defence (Maastricht Treaty 1992: 3). The latest treaty to 
happen within the structure of the European Union, was the Lisbon Treaty, which expanded on 
all of above, especially within external security and defence (Lisbon Treaty 2007: Chapter 2). 
It also expanded and renamed the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (Lisbon Treaty 2007: Title III, Art. 9B) that was introduced in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Specifically	  mentioned	  as	  France	  and	  Germany	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Amsterdam Treaty, as well as introducing the position of the President of the European 
Council. 
 
The European Union and its precursors, started as being a very internal project, in the sense 
that they were trying to increase the relations with countries within the organization, meaning 
its Member States. This process of internal integration has been emphasized during most of the 
key European Union treaties, but with the Maastricht Treaty and more recently with the Lisbon 
Treaty, there has been an increased emphasis on foreign affairs and security; There seems to be 
developing an external security and defence dimension of the European Union, alongside its 
more traditional internal dimension. 
 
With the expansion of the external relations and security policy areas, as well as the position of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, there is an 
increased focus on external relations, and as such, a greater focus on the European Union in a 
more global perspective, instead of the tradition regional one. The position of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also means that within the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, there is now a formal position in 
charge.  
 
We intend to look further into the development of foreign and security policies through the 
treaties, as well as other initiatives that are not based solely on European Union treaties, but 
instead initiatives that are connected to the European Union. In order to do so, we will look at 
the power of the European Union in terms of its external security and defence and its general 
military capabilities. Furthermore, the project will employ English School theory, in order to 
elucidate the development of external security and defence within the European Union 
framework, such as the through the treaties and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as 
well as the Common Security and Defence Policy.  
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1.2	  Working	  question	  +	  Steps:	  
Based on our problem area, our primary working question is as follows: 
 
Does the development within foreign affairs and security in the Lisbon Treaty change the 
global role of the European Union? 
 
In order to answer our working questions, we have decided on two separate steps, both with 
their own hypothesis: 
 
The first step that we will attempt in order to answer our working question, is to track the 
development within the sphere of external security and defence of the European Union, and its 
precursors, this will be done utilizing English School theory, as written by Barry Buzan (2004) 
 
Hypothesis: Our hypothesis for the first analytical step, is that the European Union has had 
significant development within the field of external security and defence, but that certain 
provisions limit its overall impact. 
 
Our second step will focus on the Power of the European Union’s external security and 
defence, as well as its military capacities. There will also be a focus on several of the European 
Union’s military operations. This will be done using Barnett and Duvall (2005), as well as 
Baldwin’s (2002) thoughts and conception of Power.  
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1.3	  Project	  Guide 
 
The purpose of this project is to answer our overall working question. We have decided to do 
this in two different steps, which represent our main analysis. Before moving onto the main 
themes within the project however, there will through our Introduction, be introduced the 
setting of our project. From there on our methods chapter, containing our methodological 
considerations, which are both in terms of approach, but also our thoughts on the data that we 
have employed. A theory chapter will follow this, but not in the traditional sense. Instead of 
having a very thorough theoretical segment early on, we have decided on making a theoretical 
introduction, as well as some of our considerations regarding said theories. The main 
theoretical literature will be introduced more thoroughly in the chapters in which they are 
primarily employed. This is done in order to keep the theories closer to where they are to be 
used within the project.  
Following this more introductory and thematic chapter, we will start with a contextualization 
chapter, which will, primarily based on European Union treaties, describe what development 
the European Union and its precursors have been through within the field of external security 
and defence. This chapter is used in conjunction with the first analysis, in order to give a 
contextual backdrop for the data being analysed. The first point of analysis, or as we have 
called it earlier, our first analytical step, focused on using Buzan’s English School approach, in 
order to look at the structure of the EU’s external security and defence sphere, but more than 
that, we will use it to see how it has developed. 
Our  second analysis, or second analytical step will focus on the Power of the EU’s external 
security and defence sphere, by using Barnett and Duvall, as well as Baldwin. We will 
furthermore look into actual cases where the EU, through the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy has ordered missions or operations. 
Following these two significant sections of our project, we intend to brings forth some of the 
analysed data and the concerns and conclusions that we have made. These will be used in a 
discussion that aims to focus and interpret the results of the analysis.  
Following the discussion, we will attempt to answer our overall working question, by using the 
data that we collected from our two steps, as well as from the ensuing discussion. 
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The last part of our project, will deal with any afterthoughts we might have gained through the 
project.  
 
1.4 Abbreviations	  
	  
EU	  =	  	   European	  Union	  
CFSP	  =	  	   Common	  Foreign	  Security	  Policy	  
CSDP	  =	  	   Common	  Security	  and	  Defence	  Policy	  
EEAS	  =	  	   European	  External	  Action	  Service	  
TFEU	  =	  	   Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
WEU	  =	  	   Western	  European	  Union	  
NATO	  =	  	   North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  	  
UN	  =	  	   United	  Nations	  
WWII	  =	   	  World	  War	  2	  
US	  =	   United	  States	  
USA	  =	  	   United	  States	  of	  America	  
USSR	  =	   Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics	  
	  
1.5 Delimitations 
As in all projects, it is impossible to cover every aspect of data that can be analysed, and this 
project does not stand apart in that regard. In terms of our first step, we have knowingly 
focused on the structural development of the external security and defence initiatives of the 
European Union and its precursors. We realize that there are several other aspects that may or 
may not have more influence in changing the global role of the European Union. Economics, 
enlargement, normative power and much else has the capacity to change the global role of the 
European Union. However our focus has will solely be on the security and defence aspect. We 
also realize that employing Buzan’s English School approach, does little to help us understand 
the intention behind the development of the European Union, aside from their own texts. The 
reason for not trying to look at the intentions or motives behind these movements, are much the 
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same as above, in that in order to get the clearest answer to the working question that we have 
posed, we will have to forego intentions and motives, as that would be an entire project in 
itself. 
2.	  Methods	  
In this chapter we are going to describe our methodological considerations. This will be done 
in relations to which type of case study we have done, what our case is and our empirical 
considerations. 
	  
2.1	  Case	  study	  
As we have outlined in our problem area, the main focus in this project is the change which has 
occurred in the foreign and security policies	  in	  the European Union. To do this we found it 
most beneficial to do a case study, where our overall case is the European Union, with focus on 
the development of security and defence policies initiatives Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, the Common Security and Defence Policy and the European External Action Service. 
Our grounds for doing a case is due to the fact that the intention is to “provide and in-depth 
elucidation of it” (Bryman 2008: 54). We are of the opinion that by choosing a case study we 
are not limiting ourselves and our project, but rather delimiting it, because it puts a restrain on 
the amount of empirical data and a more manageable timespan. 
Arguably we are doing a unique single case study (Bryman 2008:55). As it implies, it means 
that we are of the opinion that our case is unique and not to be found anywhere else. Our 
motivation for our claim is that the EU is a unique entity. There are no other organisations 
composed in the same way. In our case we are looking at the initiatives that made the European 
Union an actor in the run for maintaining international security. Furthermore we will use 
specific missions conducted by the EU, to exemplifying in our analysis. What can be argued is 
that the idea behind the security issues and pooling of capabilities is not a unique thing, since it 
is done by NATO and UN.  
 
The approach chosen in this project has been deductive. It has been so because of our opinion 
that as researchers, we already have an established basic prior knowledge about the subject and 
theoretical considerations based on earlier readings. Based on these factors, we have the 
possibility to deduce a hypothesis which we then can support through empirical evidence. The 
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general methodological research strategy which is being utilized in this project is qualitative 
research, which is the “emphasis on the role of the investigator in the construction of the 
meaning of and in text” (Bryman 2008: 697). Based on the aforementioned theoretical 
background, due to former projects within the same field, we have formed a hypothesis which 
we will then test empirically through our cases. Essentially the “theory and the hypothesis, 
deduced from it come first and drive the process of gathering data” (Bryman 2008: 9). 
	  
	  
2.2	  Empirical	  data	  
For us to conduct our research and answer our working questions, we are going to make us of 
secondary data only. Based on our methodological stance, we are basing our research on only 
qualitative data. The secondary data we collect, will be articles, papers, books, and official 
documents from the European Union, i.e. Treaties and alike. We are not going to utilize first 
hand data that we do not believe due to our methodological considerations, would bring us 
information which was not already available in already published material. 
When using material to define our theoretical framework, we are only using original texts. By 
doing so we are reducing the risk of misinterpreting the theories.  
A possibility of misinterpretation is however always there when working with secondary 
literature (Bryman 2008: 105).  
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3.	  Theoretical	  considerations	  
 
In terms of theoretical considerations, we will focus on our chosen theorists academic 
competences, while also emphasizing on the works of theirs that we are going to employ. 
Moreover, we will briefly present the main concepts of the theories we intend to use. Instead of 
giving a detailed description of all the theoretical elements in this chapter, we will instead have 
the more detailed descriptions where they are actually used in-text. As such, when our analysis 
calls for the usage of Buzan’s English School or Barnett, Duvall or Baldwin, it will be 
described then and there. Our reasoning for taking this slightly atypical approach to our 
theoretical considerations is that we believe it gives a much more natural flow when reading, in 
the sense that when we start to employ Buzan’s English School theory, it will not be necessary 
to go back 10-20 pages to find the specific theoretical considerations. The general idea is that it 
not only enables a natural flow from theory to analysis, but also that it increases one’s ability to 
understand as well as setting the pace.  
 
For our analysis, we have used Barry Buzans understanding of English School theory, Buzan 
who is a Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, or LSE. 
Furthermore he holds two honorary titles as professor, one of the Copenhagen University and 
another at the Jilin University. Through his career he has authored or co-authored several 
books and articles, mainly within the field of International Relations, and with a focus on East 
Asia and the Middle East (lse.uk). His current focus within English School theory is interstate 
society along with solidarism and pluralism, which are also the main concepts that we wish to 
employ within our analysis. In Buzan book from 2004, called From International to World 
Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization he uses his 
conception of interstate society as a graph, or scale wherein the two ‘poles’ are Solidarism and 
Pluralism, however, within this scale, are also some of the other concepts that we will work 
with, such as Power Political, Co-existence, Cooperation and Convergence. While Buzan is not 
exactly one of the founder of English School theory, such as Hedley Bull or Martin Wight, his 
approach does have distinct advantages to them. Specifically in our case the advantage is that 
he has not structured it as a grand theory, but instead has emphasized the ability to work with 
concrete and concise concepts. The thinking behind employing English School theory in the 
first place however, has more to do with its position as a middle-way, or middle-ground 
approach within International Relations, via medium as Buzan calls it. This same approach 
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however, could also open it up for critique by International Relations traditionalists, as it does 
not clearly define and limit itself in contrast to Realism or Liberalism.  
In our second chapter of our analysis, we will first define the term power. The definition we 
have chosen is a combination of Michael Barnett’s, Raymond Duvall’s, and David A. 
Baldwin’s definitions. Michael Barnett is a university professor of International Affairs and 
Political Science at The George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs. 
Raymond Duvall is a professor at the University Of Minnesota Department Of Political 
Science. Our reasoning to choose their definition was that it indicated some further elaboration 
on the basic classification made by e.g. Robert Dahl. Their definition was also interesting 
because of the fact that it acknowledges the idea that power is still present and influencing 
others while that is not the intention of the dominator. An assessment to Barnett and Duvall’s 
work on defining and conceptualizing power would be, as they argue themselves, that the term 
power is hard to classify because it “works in various forms and has various expressions that 
cannot be captured by a single formulation” (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 2). Because of that 
obstacle we are trying to have another view on the definition. We are doing so by bringing in 
the definition David a Baldwin formulated the 5 means of influence as he would rather term it. 
This will be used to try to define the different forms of means to influence others. David A. 
Baldwin is a senior political scientist at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs at Princeton University.  
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4.	  Contextualization	  
	  
Our  contextualization chapter is meant to give an overview on the initiatives made within the 
treaties of the European Union. This contextual data, will then be used throughout the project, 
but primarily within the analysis done from a Buzan’s English School approach. 
4.1	  External	  and	  security	  development	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
	  
The following chapter will deal with, as the title indicates, the external and security 
developments of the EU. It will take its point of departure in the Rome Treaty of 1957, and end 
with the Lisbon Treaty, which will be in two parts, one concerning the High Representative 
and the other the External Actions Service. It should also be noted that the dates used for the 
treaties, is not from when they went into effect, but from when they were signed and written. 
4.1.1	  Developments	  within	  the	  Rome	  Treaty	  
	  
Not arguing for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, as being the 
first example of “EU” foreign relations due to its limited scope, we will instead turn to the 
Common Commercial Policy of 1957 (Treaty of Rome 1957: Art. 110). The policy was a part 
of the Treaty of Rome or the EEC Treaty, the treaty responsible for the creation of the 
European Economic Community, for which it is also named. In the EEC Treaty, there was 
established a customs union between the Member States, with an aim to “contribute in the 
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers.” (Treaty of Rome 
1957: Title II, Art. 110). Unlike the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1951), which had an internal focus, the Treaty of Rome opened up for how trade 
with the rest of the world should be regulated, to the benefit of everyone involved. While it 
aims for the harmonious development of world trade, it does point out just after, that the 
common commercial policy will consider the positive outcomes that may be gained by the 
Member States, especially their competitive strength with the abolition of the custom barriers 
between them (Treaty of Rome 1957: Art. 110). The idea of the Treaty of Rome was, that to 
ensure cohesions the “liberalisation at internal level had to be in tune with that at external 
level” (Europa.eu, A). In order for the establishment of the Common Commercial Policy to be 
completed, the Commission was given several powers in Article 111; they are to submit 
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proposals for how to achieve the cohesion or rather the uniformity that is required for a 
Common Commercial Policy, they are however also responsible for negotiations with third 
countries on the basis of tariffs. Moreover, the Commission are to advise, consult and 
recommend the Member States in order for them to fulfil this Common Commercial Policy 
(Treaty of Rome 1957: Title II, Art. 111).  In order to bring this cohesion about, a 12 year 
transitional period was entered, where by the end, the Community (now the European Union) 
held sole competence (Europa.eu, A). While the Common Commercial Policy denotes the first 
foray into external relations, in this case trade, it would not be the last. 
Single European Act - 1986: 
4.1.2	  Developments	  within	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  
	  
In 1986, with the signing of the Single European Act, the first major revisions to the Treaty of 
Rome were made. In Title III of the Single European Act, the ‘Treaty Provisions on European 
Co-operation in the Sphere of Foreign Policy’ were introduced (Single European Act 1986, 
Title III). Article 30, makes up the entirety of these treaty provisions of foreign policy, in 12 
paragraphs. Paragraph 1 of Article 30 sets forth the relatively clear goal, that “The High 
Contracting Parties, being members of the European Communities, shall endeavour jointly to 
formulate and implement a European foreign policy” (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30.1). 
Furthermore, the 2nd paragraph sets forth, that the High Contracting Parties, or signatories are 
to consult each other on any major or general foreign policy matters, so as to be able to use the 
Community’s collective influence. Paragraph 2d describes it best, by stating that “The High 
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid any action or position which impairs their 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international 
organizations” (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30, 2.D). The remainder of the treaty 
provisions on foreign policy deals with the different rules for meetings, and which European 
institutions that needs to be informed in different situations. It is also agreed, that closer co-
operation within security, both political and economic will help in presenting a “European 
identity in external policy matters” (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30, 6.A). While a 
collective community effort is promoted in external matters of security, there are still special 
provisions for working closer with NATO or the Western European Union in these security 
matters (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30, 6.C).  
4.1.3	  Developments	  within	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	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When the Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on European Union, was signed in 
1992, it marked the birth of the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. A). 
While that can be considered the most substantial change, it is not the only substantial one. The 
Maastricht Treaty cements in the beginning that “The Union shall in particular ensure the 
consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, 
economic and development policies” (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. C). The Treaty 
however, goes further than that, in it creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
whereby “A common foreign and security policy is hereby established” (The Maastricht Treaty 
1992: Title V, Art. J). Unlike the Treaty Provisions on European Co-operation in the Sphere of 
Foreign Policy of the Single European Act, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is more 
far-reaching in what it attempts to build, as can be seen in that it aims “to assert its identity on 
the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence” (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. B). This being part of 
Title 1 of the Common Provisions indicates an emphasis on the European Union in an 
international, or even a global perspective. It is about making itself known as a player on a 
more global scale. From the Single European Act to the Maastricht Treaty, the language itself 
has changed. Where the Single European Act advised that countries were to endeavor to 
actions that would put them against the collective foreign identity of the then European 
Economic Community, the language of the Maastricht Treaty is much stricter “The Member 
States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to 
the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations” (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title V, Art. J, 1.4). In this case, the 
language does not suggest that a country simply endeavors not to do something, they are 
simply to refrain from doing it, they are to support the external and security policy ‘actively’ 
and ‘unreservedly’. It is also written into the treaty that if any matter of foreign and security 
policy for s Member State, which is of a greater or general interest to the European Union and 
its Member States, then it will have to inform and consult the Council (The Maastricht Treaty 
1992: Title V, Art. J, 2.1). Title V, which contains the provisions for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, also solidifies how its aspects are to be governed, and by whom. In all matters 
coming within Title V, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union shall represent the 
European Union. While they represent Title V and its contents, as well as enforcing it, the 
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European Council are responsible for the direction of Title V policy (The Maastricht Treaty 
1992: Title V, Art. J, 5.1). Article J, 2.3 also introduces a new aspect of the European Union’s 
new external and security policy, in that it makes provisions for, that whenever a member state 
engages in international conferences or organizations, then its Member States, be they alone or 
all represented, shall uphold the common positions of the European Union. Much the same can 
be said in the case of the United Nations Security Council, where its temporary members that 
are also Member States of the European Union, are to keep the other Member States up to date 
with any developments. In the case of the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council, who are also Member States of the European Union will “in the execution of their 
functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union” (The Maastricht 
Treaty 1992:Title V, Art J, 5.4), as long as it does not prejudice their obligations to the Charter 
of the United Nations. In contrast, it could be said that where the Single European Act laid the 
foundation for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, an initiative that more aimed at trying 
to streamline external relations between its member states, whereas the Maastricht Treaty 
created the actual Common Foreign and Security Policy. It built onto the foundation, by not 
just streamlining what already existed, but instead by creating a foreign and security policy 
area of its own. That very same development can be seen in the case of security. While it was 
hardly even mentioned in the Single European Act, it was emphasizes both in the Common 
Provisions as well as within the Provision on a Common Foreign and Security Policy, wherein 
both are open to “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence” (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. B and Title V, Art. J, 4.1).  
4.1.4	  Developments	  within	  the	  Amsterdam	  Treaty	  
	  
The Amsterdam Treaty makes certain revisions to the Common Commercial Policy, as 
introduced in the Treaty of Rome decades before it. In this case “The Amsterdam Treaty is 
intended to clarify the situation by providing the Union with the means of extending the 
common commercial policy, where applicable, to services and intellectual property rights” 
(Europa.eu. A). It also created the post of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (eur-lex.europa.eu, Title V, Art. J 8.3) 
The first use of the title of High Representative came from the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, 
within Article J, 8.3 “The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council 
who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security 
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policy” (eur-lex.europa.eu, Title V, Art. J, 8.3). However, in truth this was only the first 
version of the title, as the current head of the common foreign and security policy’s title is the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Lisbon Treaty 2009, 
Title 3, Art. 9, B.2). As described in the Amsterdam Treaty 
 “The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and 
security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common 
foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation 
and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the 
Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third 
parties” (eur-lex.europa.eu, Title V, Art. J.16). 
4.1.5	  Developments	  within	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  
	  
As mentioned, the Lisbon Treaty will be parted in 2, as we perceive these 2 parts to be the ones 
of most significant in regards to our overall working question. As can be seen in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the initial position of the High Representative was to assist the council with 
regards to the common foreign and security policy, but maintained no real autonomous power, 
this changed in the Lisbon Treaty however. The first time that the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is mentioned within the Lisbon Treaty, is within 
Article 9, B.2 where it is written that the High Representative shall take part in the work of the 
European Council (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9, B.2), without emphasizing that it is 
only in an assisting capacity. With the creation of a 2,5 year presidency for the European 
Council, it is mentioned that the President shall only represent the European Union in his/her 
own level and capacity, and that it is to be without prejudice to that of the High Representative 
(Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, 9, B.D). The Lisbon Treaty furthermore requires that a 
Commission that is appointed between the time the Lisbon Treaty goes into effect and the 31st 
of October 2014 requires the High Representative to be a part of the Commission as a Vice-
President (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9, D.4).  
While the High Representative per the Lisbon Treaty is an actual Vice-President of the 
Commission, it is not within the purview of the Commission President to actually appoint the 
High Representative, despite also filling the role of a Vice-President (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 
3, Art. 9.D,6.C). Instead, the High Representative is elected by a qualified majority vote within 
the European Council, and with the agreement of the Commission President. This is also the 
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procedure for dismissing the High Representative, requiring a qualified majority vote (Lisbon 
Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9, E.1), a vote that must be attempted if the Commission President 
requires the High Representative’s dismissal (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9 D, 6.C). 
The direct mandate of the High Representative is primarily explored in Article 9 E where as 
mentioned above, describes what the procedure for appointing and dismissing the High 
Representative is. In Article 9, E.2, the overall mandate of the High Representative is clarified 
“The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He 
shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as 
mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence 
policy”(Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9, E.2). Moreover, the High Representative shall also 
preside over the Council in its Foreign Affairs constellation, while also being responsible for 
her Vice-Presidency within the Commission, where she has duties that are bound by specific 
Commission procedures (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9, E.3 and 4).  
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) was officially created with a Council Decision 
on the 26th of July 2010 (eeas.europa.eu, A). The EEAS was created on the basis of a proposal 
from High Representative Catherine Ashford, as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, and later the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Within TEU’s Article 27.3 it 
states that “In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service” (TEU 2012, Chapter 2, Art. 27.3). Article 27.3 goes on to say that the 
EEAS is to work in cooperation with the Member States in terms of diplomatic services. 
Furthermore, it states that the EEAS itself is to be made up of staff from both the General 
Secretariat of the Council as well as from the Commission. It should also be composed of staff 
from the Member States, as it is its job to cooperate with those Member States. While it was 
officially created on the 26th of July 2010, it was first launched in January of 2011 
(eeas.europea.eu, B. Art 0.11)  
 “The EEAS will support the High Representative […] in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the Union and to ensure the consistency 
of the Union’s external action” (eeas.europa.eu, B. Article 0.3). Along with helping the High 
Representative in fulfilling her obligations in terms of the CFSP, the EEAS is to assist the High 
Representative both in her capacity as the President of the Foreign Affairs Council as well as 
her capacity as a Vice-President of the Commission (eeas.europa.eu, B. Art. 0.3). It is also the 
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responsibility of the EEAS to support the European Defence Agency, the European Satellite 
Centre, the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European Security and 
Defence College, which was before the creation of the EEAS handled by the General 
Secretariat of the Council (eeas.europa.eu, B. Art 0.7). Furthermore, the EEAS is to make itself 
available in assisting the President of the European Council as well as the President of the 
Commission, and the Commission itself in their respective areas of external relations 
(eeas.europa.eu, B. Art. 2.2). Aside from being tasked with assisting the High Representative 
in her role as High Representative as well as the Vice-President of the Commission and 
President of the Foreign Affairs Council, the most significant power, or influence is the 
transfer of several departments and functions as outlined in the Annex segment of the Council 
Decision, such as the Common Security and Defence Policy and crisis management structures. 
The departments and functions under the Directorate-General E, the Directorate-General for 
External Relations, the External Service and the Directorate-General for Development. There 
are small exceptions such as the staff that manages financial instruments, both within the 
Directorate-General for External Relations as well as the External Service (eeas.europa.eu, B. 
Annex). 
The EEAS is described in the Council Decision as being a “functionally autonomous body of 
the Union under the authority of the High Representative” (eeas.europa.eu, B. 0.1) 
It should however be taken into account that the European Parliament intends to exercise their 
power in the external actions of the Union (eeas.europea.eu, B. Art. 0.6). Specifically this 
means the political, legislative and budgetary powers afforded them in Article 14.1 of the TEU, 
which only briefly states that the European Parliament along with the Council, are to exercise 
legislative as well as budgetary powers. As also mentioned, it has certain functions by which it 
can exercise political control, as well as having consultation privileges (TEU 2012, Chapter 1, 
Art. 14.1). While the EEAS as an autonomous body in the European Union, reports to the High 
Representative, the High Representative has to consult the European Parliament “ on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP and will ensure that the views of the European 
Parliament are duly taken into consideration” (eeas.europa.eu, B. Art. 0.6). The EEAS is to 
help the High Representative with this duty, as well as helping with clearing classified 
documents for relevant EU parliamentarians. In terms of recruitment within the EEAS, the 
High Representative has the power, as she is named the Appointing Authority by the Council 
Decision in Article 0.8. While this is true, the Council Decision, does set forth certain 
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requirements as to merit, gender and geographical representativeness, as well as being 
composed of staff from both the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and 
Member State diplomats (eeas.europa.eu, B. Art. 0.10-11). According to Article 3.2 of the 
Council Decision, the Commission and the EEAS shall consult on matters that fall within the 
external actions of either EEAS or the Commission, the exception is where the Common 
Security and Defence Policy is concerned (eeas.europea.eu, B. Art. 3.2).      
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5.	  Analysis	  
As mentioned within the theoretical considerations, the analysis will start out with a 
walkthrough of the relevant theory. This is done in order to better integrate theory with 
analysis, but also as a means to limit the need to backtrack, in order to understand or remember 
the used concepts.  
5.1	  Buzan’s	  English	  School	  
The intention of the theory is to try and track the development of EU external security and 
defence initiatives throughout the treaties, but also through other relevant sources. Using 
Buzans’ English School, most prominently the scale of Pluralism-Solidarism, the purpose is to 
illustrate not only what the development and capabilities are, but also what it means for the 
member states of the EU.  
It should also be noted, that while using Buzans’ English School theory and concepts, we are 
doing so from the perspective of the nations involved with the EU, i.e. the Member States. We 
do this, because we realize that the angle of interpretation can feasibly change the results of the 
analysis. The idea is that while one from one perspective, the developments can indicate a large 
degree of Convergence, another perspective could construe it as Power Political.  
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Barry Buzan’s perspective on English School theory takes its point of departure in two main 
concepts; Pluralism and Solidarism. These two concepts are used in a scale, in order to 
determine their respective degrees of influence. As can be seen on the model above, the 
primary points on the scale between Pluralism and Solidarism is that of Power Political, 
Coexistence, Cooperative, Convergence and Confederative. 
 Buzan himself defines Power Political as “enmity and the possibility of war” (Buzan 2004: 
159-160), but also notes that such things as diplomacy, trade and alliances are still in existence, 
however the main goal for applying this is survival. This also leads to Buzan noting that 
institutions will have a minimal existence within Power Politics (Buzan 2004: 160). 
 Coexistence to Buzan is a term that can encompass most everything depending on the spin, but 
in conjunction with his scale between Pluralism and Solidarism, then Coexistence is based on 
the traditional European Westphalian system of states. To Buzan it means that the key terms or 
institutions we need to associate with it are the “balance of power, sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy, great power management, war and international law” (Buzan 2004: 160). You 
could argue based on this, that the idea is of an existence in which all states are supreme within 
their own borders, national sovereignty, not just because they happen to hold power within a 
geographically set area, but because they are recognized by the other states as being the 
sovereign power of that geographically set area, and with recognition comes right and rules.  
Cooperative is one of the harder terms to define and as Buzan himself notes, it “´might come in 
many guises, depending on what type of values are shared and how/why they are shared” 
(Buzan 2004: 160). The problem with these many guises is that they are in danger of 
overlapping with either the Coexistence term on the one hand, or the Convergence term on the 
other. As can be seen on the spectrum itself, it is on the line between Pluralism and Solidarism, 
meaning it has the potential for both. While Coexistence faces some of the same challenges, 
they are much less obvious. 
Convergence in Buzan’s spectrum on Pluralism and Solidarism deals with not only coexisting 
or cooperating, but more of a policy and institutional streamlining “States acknowledge and 
pursue coordination of policies, collective action, norms, organizations and institutions” 
(Buzan 2004: 146). Instead of having 5 different economic setups between 5 cooperating 
states, then Convergence would signify a development where these different cooperating or 
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  22	  
allied countries would actively try to mould their economic setups to ‘converge’ on each other. 
However, while certain elements in these 5 different countries might be ‘converging’ on each 
other, true Convergence means that the “range of shared values has to be wide enough and 
substantial enough to generate similar forms of government” (Buzan 2004: 160). This could in 
principle be any of the major ideological governing models such as liberal democracies or 
communist totalitarianism (Buzan 2004: 160). Things are however, rarely purely one or the 
other, and having a focus on the external aspect of the European Union, will also mean that we 
will not work with the overall structure of the European Union, and as such cannot make any 
general statements on its overall Convergence or otherwise. 
Confederative can be said to be the end game of Convergence. If Convergence means countries 
actively modelling themselves after each other, then Confederative is not just modelling, but a 
pooling of power, such as a collective political entity (Buzan 2004: 160), “It is a convergence 
international society with the addition of significant intergovernmental organizations” (Buzan 
2004: 160).   
Having presented the theory to be applied, as well as how we intend to work with it in 
conjunction with our source material, we will now move onto analysing the development of the 
external security and defence sphere of the EU. 
 
5.1.1	  Structural	  Developments	  in	  an	  English	  School	  Perspective	  
The first treaty of the EU, the one that opened the door for a larger degree of European 
collaboration, was the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of 
Paris 1951), or less formally the Treaty of Paris. The treaty consists of 4 titles named The 
European Coal and Steel Community, the Institutions of the Community, Economic and Social 
Provisions and General Provisions, none of which are involve matters of collective external 
security (Treaty of Rome 1951). The treaty officially became defunct with the Treaty of Nice 
in 2001, where several of its provisions where included in the European Community (Treaty of 
Nice 2001: Part 1, Art. 1 § 15). On the basis of the Schuman Declaration, which proposed the 
creation of a Coal and Steel Community (europa.eu, B), the focus was practically the opposite 
of suggesting any form of external action or policy, instead in the words of Robert Schuman 
the purpose of this community was to make sure that “The solidarity in production thus 
established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely 
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unthinkable, but materially impossible” (The Schuman Declaration 1950: 1) as well as laying “ 
a true foundation for their economic unification” (The Schuman Declaration 1950: 1).  
 
Taking a Buzan English School stance on the commitments of the Coal and Steel Community, 
in the perspective of collective security can lead to reviewing the nature of the treaty and its 
history. As quoted above in the Schuman Declaration (1950: 1) one of the main motives for 
creating the Coal and Steel Community in the first place, was to make sure that war would be 
impossible among the Great Powers of Europe, specifically the 2 mainland Europe great 
powers of France and Germany. However, the Schuman Declaration and its motives for the 
creation of a supranational European entity is not explicitly part of the Treaty of Paris. Despite 
that fact, it would be hard not to attribute influence to the Schuman Declaration in the creation 
of the Treaty of Paris, the motive of its creation, and maybe more than that, the arguable result 
of it. As such, the overall picture painted is Pluralistic in general, but not to the extent of 
talking Power Political, as the initiative in itself shied away from even the possibility of war. 
While it is noted by Buzan that Power Political does not equate to the non-existence of 
diplomacy, the importance of diplomacy and alliances are limited. As such the most apt 
concept to apply to the fledgling European supranational organization seems to be Coexistence, 
as the Schuman Declaration more or less states that the concept of Coexistence is the main 
motive. This is also supported in that it deals with the management of great powers, in this case 
primarily France and Germany as well as the obvious emphasis on diplomacy, it does not 
however put any emphasis on a supranational defence or security constellation.  
 
While the first foray into external defence would only come later, the Rome Treaty would be 
the first step to an opening of collaboration on external relations in a larger scale, by focusing 
on economic integration, but also development of world trade in many aspects, such as less 
restriction on trading internationally and custom barriers (Treaty of Rome 1957: Title II, Art. 
110). The first step in a treaty in trying to deal with external defence and security came from 
the Single European Act of 1986, where it was promoted working together in matters external 
matters (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30, §6c), but the point of view was still nation to 
nation, instead of a more supranational response. Taking a Buzan English School approach 
here, garners much the same considerations and response that the Treaty of Paris did, in the 
sense that while it is promoted through a treaty that is part of a supranational entity, the 
promotion itself was for nations to work together more closely, but not in any official 
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framework within the organization. As a matter of fact, it was not only promoted for the 
member states to work closer in terms of external defence and security, but it was also 
promoted working together with either the Western European Union2 or NATO, both of which 
were outside of the official framework (Single European Act 1986: Art. 30, §6c). Without any 
actual framework willing to take responsibility or command of any security or defence element 
within the European Union-precursor, nothing indicates a case of Convergence, but instead 
strides the line between Coexistence and Cooperation. The reason for not fully committing to 
Cooperation in the case of the Single European Act is primarily that the encouragement of 
external defence and security in itself does not guarantee or demand any form of action. The 
sentiment itself is of course more Solidaristic than Pluralistic, but in the end, on paper the 
sentiment seems too vaguely worded to carry much actual impact. 
    
 If the Single European Act marked the inception of a joint EU foreign policy, then the 
Maastricht Treaty and its Common Foreign and Security Policy marked the birth of an official 
security and defence element within the EU. The Single European Act advised and encouraged 
external security and defence cooperation, but was unable to actually put that sentiment to 
paper. The Maastricht Treaty’s Common Foreign and Security Policy however, attempted just 
that. Where the Single European Act wanted to create an international identity of sorts, it did 
so, on the basis of politics and economics as opposed to the Maastricht Treaty in which it states 
that it wants the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as an eventual common defence 
policy, to be part of that international identity (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. B), 
thus brining military power into the equation. Another point missing from the previous treaties 
is that the Member States of the European Union are to support the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, and by extension the eventual external security and defence policy of the 
Union. While being a part of the European Union means following and supporting the above, it 
is also noted that the member states themselves outside of an EU setting shall not in any way 
work counter to the EU external security and defence policy, as well as the general interests of 
the EU (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title V, Art. J.1, § 4). This position is carried on in cases 
outside of the EU, where member states in various settings are to uphold the agreed upon 
positions of the EU, the clearest example of this is members states that have either temporary 
and permanent seats within the United Nations Security Council, are to protect the interests of 
the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title V, Art J.5, §4).  This would arguably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  Western	  European	  Union	  (WEU)	  will	  be	  introduced	  more	  thoroughly	  as	  we	  progress.	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constitute the first case of real Convergence within the field of external security and defence, as 
the member states would now be committed by signature to a supranational security and 
defence initiative. More importantly, it means that the member states are prepared to accept 
certain decisions within the field of external security and defence in a collective and uniform 
matter, which is arguably linking previously domestic sovereign policies to a supranational 
one, and as constitutes a moulding or a convergence between the member states. Another point 
to be made is the fact that committing to a policy that allows for a collective structure meant to 
protect the EU, and as such the member states of the EU: “Convergence […] in its stronger 
forms will involve acceptance of some responsibility for other members of the community” 
(Buzan 2004: 148). 
The next treaty within the EU framework would be the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which 
contained a significant development in the creation of the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The title and position itself was more meant to assist the 
Council with its duties within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as opposed to actually 
leading it. In fact, it is mentioned that the duties of the High Representative is primarily 
helping with formulating policy positions, as well as their preparation and implementation 
(eur-lex.europa.eu, Title V, Art. J.16).In terms of Buzan’s English School, it is somewhat hard 
to determine the impact of the High Representative, as the position did not include much 
autonomous power, as it was created primarily in order to assist. However, it would be 
negligent not to comment on the potential symbolic value, and its value as a stepping stone. 
The fact that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which would also come to include the 
Common Security and Defence Policy and much more, had a figurehead, one that was 
connected to the role of the Secretary-General of the Council, meant that despite its limited 
direct capacity, it was not a hollow title. Moreover, having a single title to represent the 
external aspects of the European Union, could also be interpreted as a pooling or convergence 
on the part of its member states.     
The formulation of a common defence policy, as mentioned to be formulated in the Maastricht 
Treaty (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Title I, Art. B) finally came to be during the 3rd and 4th of 
June 1999, during the Cologne European Council (europa.eu, C:  Annex III) where it was 
written that the European Council intended to step up to the plate, with the intention of giving 
the EU and opportunity to step up to the international stage and “To that end, we intend to give 
the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities 
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regarding a common European policy on security and defence” (europa.eu, C:  Annex III). In 
connection to the CSDP, the following European Council meeting, that took place in December 
of 1999 in Helsinki had a segment on the common European policy on security and defence 
(Europa.eu, D). Within that segment is what is known as the Helsinki Headline Goals (Helsinki 
Headline Goal 1999: 1). It states that the goal is that, within 2003 the EU will be able to field 
50.000-60.000 persons, within “the full range of the Petersberg tasks as set out in the 
Amsterdam Treaty” (Helsinki Headline Goal 1999: 1). While the CDSP is what defines the 
operational capacities of the EU (Lisbon Treaty 2007: Section 2, Art. 49 § 1), the Petersberg 
tasks defines de range of actions or operations that are allowed for, which in the original 1992 
Petersberg Declaration was the “implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management 
measures, including peacekeeping activities” (Petersberg Declaration 1992: 1.2). The WEU 
and Petersburg Tasks were not going to stay outside of the EU forever. As described in the 
Cologne European Council in 1999, the EU is “now determined to launch a new step in the 
construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to 
prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the 
definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be 
necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks” 
(europa.eu, C: Annex III). After the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999, another Headline Goal 
was made, called the Headline Goals 2010 (Headline Goal 2010), it build upon the goals set for 
2003, in the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals, as they were believed to have certain shortfalls 
(Headline Goals 2010: A.2). Within these 2010 Headline Goals, it was also affirmed that the 
EU would commit themselves to being able to deal with the elements set out in the Petersberg 
tasks, such as “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking” (Headline Goal 2010: 1, A.2) but also potentially 
joint disarmament operations. More specifically however, the 2010 Headline Goal moves to 
create what they term ‘minimum force packages’ referred to as being based on the Battlegroups 
concept(Headline Goals 2010: 2, A.4).  
 
All of the above points of interest, from the Helsinki Headline Goal created through the 
Cologne European Council, to the Petersberg tasks outlined in the Petersbergs Declaration of 
1992, as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy all mainly contribute to a single 
aspect of the EU. An aspect that, from the EU precursor treaty, the Treaty of Paris of 1951, and 
all the way till the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 had not formally been developed on; external 
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security and defence. The CSDP described the operational capacities of the EU, while the 
Petersberg Declaration and its derived Petersberg tasks set out to define that actions and 
operations that could be taken. The Headline Goals, both Helsinki and 2010, but perhaps more 
importantly, the European Council meetings that created them, indicated the degree of security 
and defence movement within the EU. It could be argued that the willingness of the Member 
States to allow the EU to build a security and defence framework, and as such give the EU 
access to powers of the more Realism oriented Pluralism, which would mean that it was indeed 
a more Pluralism oriented move. However, first of all, the pooling of power, the moulding or 
convergence of military capacity as well as a more collective Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, in which a Common Security and Defence Policy exists would also indicate a high 
degree of solidarity, the root of Solidarism. While the sector or area in which the convergence 
happens to be military, security or defence oriented, the move itself strikes more of a chord 
with Convergence and Soldarism.  
 
“The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decides” (TFEU 2012: Section 2. Art. 42.2) It is also mentioned in the current 
consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of the Function of the 
European Union, that this cooperation, or convergence within the field of external security and 
defence will lead to a common defence, but this is not active, in the sense that it is only when 
the European Council so decides, and even so, it will only happen unanimously. While it has 
not come to pass as of yet, the idea of common European Defence could easily be seen as a 
form of Convergence. In terms of external security and defence, it could even be seen a prime 
example of Convergence, as it leaves no doubt about the active effort on the part of the EU 
Member States to mould their defence policies, and a pooling of power. 
 
 
The reason for not having dealt with the Western European Union (WEU) as of yet, is that it 
was an institution that was not completely part of the EU framework till it either got absorbed 
by the Lisbon Treaty, or simply that provisions for existing treaties dealt with the same issues 
as the WEU (WEU 2010: 3). 
It is noted in the Statement of the WEU, that with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, along with its Common Security and Defence Policy, and other responsibilities, that 
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with the Lisbon Treaty having been passed, and adopted that any attack on one of its Member 
States will be seen as an attack on all, that “the WEU has therefore accomplished its historical 
role. In this light we the States Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty have collectively 
decided to terminate the Treaty, thereby effectively closing the organization” (WEU 2010: 3). 
So with the EU via the Lisbon having absorbed or implemented the last aspects of the WEU, 
and as such having incorporated all of the above organizations, goals and treaties, a new post 
was created. Or rather, the High Representative post created in the Amsterdam Treaty was 
reconfigured in a much more autonomous fashion, and with its own semi-ministry in the form 
of the European External Action Service, or the EEAS (TEU 2012, Chapter 2, Art. 27.3)( 
eeas.europa.eu, B. Art. 0.3). 
 The High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy received a 
massive amount of departments that had previously been under the control of the Council or 
other EU institutions. Aside from being a Vice-President of the Commission, Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Council (Lisbon Treaty 2009 and the head of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Title 3, Art. 9 D §4), the High Representative also heads the CSDP as well as 
having departments and functions within the Directorate-General E, the Directorate-General 
for External Relations, the External Service and the Directorate-General for Development 
(eeas.europa.eu, B. Annex). While it may seem like the High Representative has a lot of power 
within the field of external security and defence, it is also limited to representing as well as 
development and implementation as the Council mandates (Lisbon Treaty 2009, Title 3, Art. 9 
E §2). While the High Representative could be argued to be the leading role within everything 
security and defence related within the EU, it should still be remember that “Decisions relating 
to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to 
in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from 
a Member State.” (TFEU 2012: Chapter 2, Art. 42.4). 
 
5.1.2	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Structural	  Development	  
The EU post Lisbon Treaty, would indicate a further development on the Convergence-front, 
that has been steadily moving forwards since the CFSP of the Maastricht Treaty 1992, and as 
such, a further development towards Solidarism on the Pluralist-Solidarist spectrum. As Buzan 
mentions in From International to World Society “The EU is a pretty advanced case of 
conscious convergence among states” (Buzan 2004: 148), and this would also seem to be the 
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case in matters of the external security and defence developments within the EU.  It could be 
considered a tricky attempting to do a Pluralism/Solidarism analysis on a matter of military, 
security and defence. Especially as those are typically the power-factors allowed for in a more 
Realist perspective, which is where Pluralism traditionally stems from, and as such could be 
assumed to be somewhat one sided. However a point separation in Pluralism and Solidarism 
within English School has traditionally been, and still is, Sovereignty, or more specifically 
intervention. If we assume, as Buzan comments, that the question of Sovereignty means 
different things on each side of the Pluralist/Solidarist spectrum, then Pluralism would 
represent the more Westphalian point of view3, where intervention then would have no legal or 
moral basis, as opposed to the Solidarist point of view, where it could be argued that 
intervention, despite sovereignty could both have a legal but especially a moral basis (Buzan 
2004: 219). If we are to look at how Buzan’s English School has been used during this 
analysis, and the results gained from it, then it would indicate a development with very little 
Pluralist influence. It could be argued based on the Schuman Declaration and the subsequent 
Coal and Steel Community that the Pluralist interstate society and Power Politics is what was 
attempted to be left behind. While it may not have had the fastest development, it is still 
significant that from the late 1930’s and WWII Europe a union of European states have arisen, 
that has gone from a tentative agreement meant to, according to the Schuman Declaration, 
make war between the Great Powers of Europe impossible to the massive collaborative effort 
that is the EU, where currency, law and defence are all governed to a lesser or greater extent. In 
vein of this thought, Buzan argues that  “Pluralism is abandoned when states not only 
recognize that they are alike in this sense, but see that a significant degree of similarity is 
valuable, and seek to reinforce the security and the legitimacy of their own values by 
consciously linking with other who are like-minded, building a shared identity with them” 
(Buzan 2004: 147) While this quote may represent a broader EU perspective than what has 
been focused on throughout this analysis, it still manages to get the point across, that the EU 
have indeed left behind Pluralist thinking, and converged on a significantly more Solidarist 
base.  
	  
In the next chapter we are firstly going to define the term power. We are then leading that into 
an understanding of power within international relations. Afterwards we will try to determine a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  As	  mention	  in	  the	  theoretical	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter	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way of measuring power.  We will then go on to use the defined power variables on specific 
EU cases, in Mali, Somali and Kosovo. 
5.2	  Power	  
The common notion of Power is basically understood through a simple formula if you will: that 
A gets B to do something that B would otherwise not have done. In this formula it is not taken 
into account what B would have done with the absence of A (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011:45). 
This is also termed as compulsory power. This basic notion has been discussed further. The 
question is whether A still has power over B, when B misinterprets the intentions of A, and 
therefore alters its engagements. Barnet and Duvall (2005) suggest that power is still existing 
although it was never the purpose of A. Furthermore they maintain that “power is best 
understood from the perspective of the recipient, not the deliverer, of the direct action” (Barnet 
& Duvall 2005: 14). Another definition derived from the basic understanding, is instead that 
power is “the ability or potential to influence others” (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011:45).  
Compulsory power and the definition hereof, have been very significant within the field of 
international relations and international politics. Compulsive power has been used as a tool to 
explain “how one state is able to use material resources to advance its interests in direct 
opposition to the interests of another state” (Barnett & Duvall 2005: 14). The basics of 
compulsory power have been associated with the realist and neo-realist thinkers and the more 
Pluralistic views. They quantify state’s power through “size of population and territory, 
resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and 
competence” (Waltz 1993: 50). An example hereof would be: the greater the army the more 
power you hold over others, or the greater economic capabilities you have, the more 
opportunities you have for investing in military or advanced technology. Compulsory power 
can also be designated as hard power, where your power is measured through material 
capabilities. 
Nonetheless, today the magnitude of your military is not equivalent to your genuine capability 
to effect or control. The power balance is no longer static, and today is more dependent on the 
case at hand. An example hereof would be Japan, they have a lot of power economically 
against other actors, but close to none relating military power.  
A much acknowledged term when discussion the actions of the actors in international relations 
are the idea of balancing of powers. The international system is by many scholars conceived as 
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being anarchical, where states attempt to balance each other’s powers. The fear is that “because 
any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force 
with force, or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, 
imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist” (Jørgensen 2010:89-90). The notion of 
balancing power can be done differently, based on the strategy. The first way to do it is by 
internal balancing. This means that the actors themselves increases or enhances their own 
capabilities. The second action to be taken can be the external balancing. This is when the 
actors participate and form a coalition, to balance out the rival together (Mearsheimer 2009: 
243). By looking at the historical facts, it is evident, that we have been through a multipolarity, 
which after the Second World War became a bipolar system with the USSR and the US as the 
poles, upholding status quo. After the fall of USSR, the US has been seen as the unipolar 
power. Today the system is no longer as clearly determined. New states are prospects for 
becoming great powers; large organizations are gaining influence and power autonomously 
from states (Hass 2008). An example of this could be the European Union as we will further 
elaborate on in our analysis. 
For our analytical purpose, we are going to define what means a there is for actors to project 
their power. These definitions will be the ones Baldwin (Baldwin 2002) classified. He 
categorized the means into 4 types of means; (1) symbolic, (2) economic, (3) military and 
lastly (4) diplomatic. Symbolic mean is the notion that an actor “appeals to normative symbols 
as well as the provision of information” (Baldwin 2002: 179). When talking about economic 
means, we are referring to the influence other states have by either opening up for trade, or 
reducing the willingness to trade. The military means are basically, as discussed earlier, use of 
military force, technology and knowledge. Lastly the diplomatic means, are based on 
negotiations and representation.  
Within international relations the terms hard and soft power has become some general overall 
terms. Relating back to our four definitions, the symbolic and diplomatic power would be 
considered soft powers and the economic and military power are considered to be the hard 
powers. The constant discussion going on within the field of international relations is the 
question of what power is needed for an actor to become significant. The realists believe that 
through hard power, you get more power, in the sense that it is quantifiable, and thereby 
determinable. This is of course not the case with the soft powers, since it is not something 
measurable. In the end what you see as power, is related to which school you ascribe to, 
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  32	  
whether it is the realistic, liberalistic or constructivist. A constructivist would for instance focus 
on the soft powers, like normative values and alike.  
It is clear to define who has the most power if each part is divided like this. The problem which 
power discussion entails is nevertheless, how you sum up the overall power of a state or actor. 
Essentially, power is as explained earlier, a relational concept, this therefore means that we can 
only measure it between states or actors. This means, that power can only be ”relative to other 
states’ power” (Goldstein & Pevehouse 2011: 47). 
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5.2.1	  Power	  and	  the	  EU	  
As we have previously argued, the CSDP is clearly the initiative that implies a united EU 
striving to become more than just “just a sum of its national parts” (Toje 2010: 43). This 
initiative implies that the EU has the ambition to become part of the international arena, as an 
actor, as mentioned previously. The discussion that arises however is, what kind of power is 
the EU then. Power in international relations is no longer contained to states only, but it has 
become extensively divided, and numerous actors hold power (Hass 2008). We will only 
briefly touch upon the overall power aspect of EU and focus more on the power of CFSP and 
EAS and the Mali case. 
 
Of course the European Union holds a lot of power within Europe. The member states have 
signed treaties and alike giving up some of their sovereignty on certain policy areas. We will 
however not analyse the power which the Union holds over its member states. But what we 
will focus on is; what power does the EU have, and what are their capabilities on the 
international scene. We will be using the 4 classifications of power to determine this.  By 
looking at the 4 categories, the first one consists of symbolic power. Roughly said the EU has 
symbolic power in different ways. There is a certain standard required for the member states to 
uphold, and a certain set of rules to even join the Union. For instance you have to live up to an 
international recognised standard on human rights. An example where the EU is using 
symbolic means to influence another actor will follow later.   
The fact that they represent a wide array of countries, does give them some diplomatic power, 
this is due to the fact that they represent 27 nations. However, this diplomatic power has only 
been attained recently through the introduction of a High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This new position has together with the CSDP and CFSP 
shown some indications that they strive to become an actor amongst the other nations and 
organisations maintaining international security.  
As we discussed in the theoretical chapter, economy has always been one of the major means 
and indications of power in our definition hereof. When looking at the economic capabilities, 
the European Union as a united economy is evidently a major player (CIA – World fact book). 
Its total GDP is bigger than any other nation surpassing even USA and China. Although this 
would seem as if they have strong economic capabilities, it is not necessarily the case. The 
reason for this is that the European Union is still an organization and not a state. Its economy is 
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  34	  
spread across its member states, meaning that each state controls their economy individually. 
But the new initiatives do show that the members are willing to let EU represent them. 
 
The last means of power we will look at is the military capabilities which the EU and CSDP 
actually have, to determine their hard power. What does raise curiosity is of course, why does 
an organization such as the EU, which is based on economic and increased political 
corporation, need an autonomous military force under their command. The EU leaders agreed 
in 1999 on the Cologne European Council that the Union should have “the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and 
the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions 
by NATO” (EEAS 2011). The first initiative was the Helsinki Headline Goal where the idea 
foremost was to have a Rapid Reaction Force. In 2010 the European Union’s Member States 
consisted of 1.620.188 military personnel (EDA 2010). In comparison, China had in 2012 
2.285 million active forces (The Economist 2013) and the United States had about 1.4 million 
active military personnel, meaning that based on manpower, the EU came in second.  What is 
however not considered by just looking at those numbers are things like the modernization of 
equipment. Here the European forces are highly modernized, and compared to many other of 
the great powers, they have discarded the Cold War-era equipment (EU Institute for Security 
Studies 2013).  Looking at the facts, the military of the European Union has a significant size, 
and it is viable to talk about them as having a military power. However the size of military has 
been deteriorating since 2006 where the number of active personnel was 1.940 million. This of 
course goes hand in hand with the decrease in military expenditures (EU Institute for Security 
Studies 2013), plus it is part of a plan to professionalise the forces, instead of a philosophy of 
“the more the merrier” it has changed to “quality over quantity”.  
 
So how much power does the European Union have when considering the 4 categories defined 
earlier. By just looking at them in a very general and overall manner, the EU holds a significant 
amount of power. It shows the prospects of a future with a European Union as a global actor, 
this does however require changes institutionally, and that member states are willing to give up 
more sovereignty. There are still obstacles for the EU; the Member States still lead their own 
foreign policy, economic policy etc. Furthermore the EU are still, to use the more realistic 
notion, bandwagoning. To stand stronger they have alliances with NATO and USA to increase 
their ability to influence the international system (Toje 2011). Asle Toje defines EU as a small 
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  35	  
power. By this is understood a power that cannot be termed as a great power, but still, as 
Stephen Walt proclaims, a “state that matter” (Toje 2011: 46). Unlike great powers which 
project their power on a global scale, a small power is characterised by only involving itself 
with conflicts considered “local” (Toje 2011: 48). This fits the profile of the European Union, 
as it is evident that they are only involving themselves with issues that are regional or 
geographical close. An overall view of the missions and operations done by the European 
Union clearly shows that there is a clear tendency in where and what the European Union is 
involved in. The most common areas are Africa and Eastern Europe, and some Middle Eastern 
countries, basically the countries that in some way are adjacent to the European Union. This 
indicates that the EU has taken a very defensive strategy, which is a characteristic of a small 
power. An example here of is the missions in the Sahel region, with the most recent case of 
Mali.  
	  
5.2.2	  European	  Union	  missions	  
We will utilize some of the missions as exemplifying cases on how the European Union has 
been projecting their power. We will look at the cases of Somalia, Mali and Kosovo. Each case 
represents different ways in which the missions have been conducted. Somalia and Mali is both 
termed as military missions, but does have clear differences, and the Kosovo mission is 
considered a civilian mission. The military missions are being conducted under the United 
Nation Security Council mandate, which validates their intervention into sovereign states.  
	  
5.2.3	  Mali	  
Mali is one of the most recent missions which the EU has gotten involved in. The problematic 
situation due to military and terror groups in the country has gravely endangered the Malian 
population. Furthermore the dangers of Mali becoming a failed state (Foreign policy 2013), 
and becoming a nest for terrorism does make it a threat to not only the Sahel region but also the 
countries in the European Union (EUTM Mali 2013). The situation could eventually not only 
make the whole region unstable, but would also lead to an increase in refugees to EU Member 
States.  
Therefore EU has clear interest in helping Mali back on a stable course. Although the mission 
in Mali is termed as a military mission, the basis for the mission is to educate the Malian 
Armed Forces, and not to partake in any combat operations (EUTM Mali 2013). The idea is 
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not for the EU to act as enforcers, but to let the Malian authorities restore order and democracy 
in the country. Although the EU possesses a substantial army, they do not have intentions of 
being involved in actual combat in this case. However by educating the Malian Armed Forces, 
the EU contributes to an increase in their military capabilities. Military capabilities are not only 
man power but also military and strategic knowledge. And here the EU is one of the most 
modernised militaries (SOURCES). In other terms, it is arguable to call this mission a soft 
military mission. Compared to this the mission in Somalia is clearly more in the sense of a 
hard mission. 
	  
5.2.4	  Somalia	  
The mission in Somalia has been set in motion due to the increase of piracy in the region. Over 
the last couple of years, ships have been subjects to armed robbery and in some cases with the 
crew being kidnapped and held hostage. Therefore on this mission, the EU has deployed round 
1400 forces to address the problematic situation. In this case the Mission is to actively stop 
piracy with force and to have them prosecuted and convicted. In comparison to the Mali case 
which was geographically close and a potential terror threat, the problem with piracy does not 
directly have any close relation to the EU. Indirectly it of course affects the Member States 
with their shipments being robbed, and Member State citizens being in danger which was also 
the case in Mali. The interesting thing with this case is that there is no direct endangerment to 
the EU. Furthermore NATO and other states which are geographically closer are also engaging 
in ending the piracy threat. Therefore the question rises, why is the EU engaging in such a 
mission. Keeping the earlier notion of EU being a small power in mind, Robert Keohane, 
classified different types on how actors can behave in international politics. One of the 
classifications he determines is the system-affecting states. They are not influential on their 
own, but can through hard work and collaboration with others alike, have an impact on the 
system (Toje 2011:45).  
	  
5.2.5	  Kosovo	  
As the last case, we will as mentioned turn our attention to the Kosovo mission. In contrast to 
the other two cases, this mission is considered a civilian mission. The goal with this mission is 
to support and assist the Kosovo authorities in achieving a certain international recognized 
standard within the rule of law area, explicitly the police, judiciary and customs areas. 
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Basically this mission is about monitoring, counselling and mentoring (EULEX Kosovo 2012). 
Unlike the other two cases where the power consisted of military, the means used is symbolic. 
They are projecting their values and ideas onto Kosovo, and by that somewhat changing their 
behaviour or actions. The mutual collaboration in this case is related to the fact that Kosovo is 
a prospect member of EU, and they therefore need to live up to a certain international and 
European standard. We are aware that other issues than EU being the stronger power, is the 
reason for the change in behaviour by Kosovo. Kosovo is seen as a prospect member state, 
being one of the last Balkan states which is not a member of the European Union.  
The three cases show how differently the missions of the EU are being conducted, and what 
capabilities they are utilizing. In the next chapter we will further develop our findings and 
discuss them.  
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6.	  Discussion	  
	  
We will attempt to look at what we determined in the analysis, as well as what scope that 
illustrates. The reason for doing this is that the composition and development of the EU and its 
precursors within the field of external security and defence has been rather complex and 
haphazard.  
Before the inception of the EU or any of its precursors, the European nations could be argued 
to be in a state more comparable to Power Political in the spectrum of Pluralism/Solidarism, It 
was a world divided. However, the shortly after the end of the WWII several initiatives came 
into being, such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). Both of these organisations however have had a military presence since they came 
into existence (NATO.int: 2) (UN.org) as opposed to the Coal and Steel Community which 
constituted the first step towards the EU we know today. Within the pre-European Union 
framework4 there was no real, or official collective defence and security initiative, not until the 
CFSP came into being with the Maastricht Treaty. While that is true for from a “within-the-
EU” perspective, there were still other initiatives that had connections to the pre-EU structure, 
such as the WEU, with its Petersberg tasks. However, following the development of the CFSP 
and CSDP from the Maastricht Treaty and all the way to the Lisbon Treaty, the situation 
changed. The Petersberg tasks where incorporated into the EU framework, as well as the 
majority of the WEU functions, to such a degree that it was disassembled post-Lisbon. 
Following the Buzan English School analysis, we determined that the development of the EU 
within the external security and defence sphere had gone from a Coexistence-based focus, to 
one of steadily increasing Convergence, having more and more streamlined their approach to 
external security and defence within the EU, as well as having pooled certain capacities, and 
even through the Lisbon Treaty haven taken responsibility for their co-Member States security. 
It was mentioned in the analysis that the Common Security and Defence Policy is meant to 
lead to a greater cooperation within the sphere of external security and defence, in the form of a 
common European Union defence policy. It was however also mentioned, that for this to 
happen, it would have to receive a unanimous vote from the European Council. It could be 
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  In	  this	  case,	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  the	  ratification	  of	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  that	  officially	  established	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  European	  Union.	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argued, that the fact that it has not come to pass as of yet, signifies a certain aversion to more 
external security and defence development.  
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a vote for a new treaty, meant to replace the old ones. It 
was called the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004). The main point of 
relevance in terms of external security and defence, is that the Constitutional Treaty wanted to 
change the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to The Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (Constitutional Treaty 2004:  Title V, Art. I-28). While the 
Constitutional Treaty did not succeed in getting ratified, it is noticeable that the post of The 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs was kept. In that vein, while it was not changed to The 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the title of the High Representative was still changed, but 
to a much lesser degree than what was proposed. So despite the developments within the 
external security and defence, there are still areas that the Member States of the European 
Union does not seem comfortable with. The creation of an actual common defence as 
mentioned above is one, another it seems, is having an actual Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, instead of a High Representative. In the case of Pluralism/Solidarism on a scale or 
spectrum, one of the more significant developments seem to be that the EU has expressed a 
willingness to step into the global arena, and the development of their military capacities as 
well as having been involved in several missions and operations (Europa.eu, E), signify a 
willingness to put intervention before sovereignty. This can be seen on the following picture, 
illustrating the extent of both EU external civilian and military operations. 
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5 
 
While working on the analysis we noted that there are aspects which when analysed depends 
on the perspective in which one views the EU. Primarily this comes up when one looks at the 
spectrum of between Pluralism and Solidarism, where Pluralism, within which Power Political 
exists, that the armament of the EU, or rather its development within the security and defence 
sphere, could be interpreted as a Power Political development. The reason for this is that in our 
analysis, there has been no consideration towards the intention for the development, aside from 
what little the EU itself has stated. The reason for not having done this is that it would be an 
entire project in itself, to try and fully understand the intentions behind these developments, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  (Europa.eu,	  E)	  
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  41	  
both from the EU as well as the individual Member States perspectives. So when we have 
throughout the analysis pointed out that it is a development best described as Solidaristic 
Convergence, then it is merely for the criteria it fulfils, and not any analysed motives for that 
particular action or development. Another valid point to be made, is that it the EU as a self-
contained entity, could be construed as having been in the process of arming itself, however, 
we view the EU not as a self-contained entity, but as the name suggests, a union of European 
states that primarily only has the capacity to act, that its Member States collectively allow for. 
This is also supported by Article 42.4 of the TFEU (2012) where it is written that “Decisions 
relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as 
referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously” (TFEU 2012, 
Section 2, Art. 42.4). As such, English School analysis is done from the perspective of the 
Member States.  
 
One of the primary reasons for being able to call the security and defence development of the 
EU Solidaristic, despite the structure of the development itself, is that it is an initiative that 
supports intervention, one of the old key dividers between Pluralism and Solidarism. It does so 
in conjunction with, or with the permission of the United Nations. The reason for this, is that 
the in Declaration 13 of the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) it stresses that that “the European 
Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its 
Members for the maintenance of international peace and security” (TFEU 2012: Declaration 
13). Furthermore it is stated within the provisions for the CSDP that the actions, operations 
such as peace-keeping and conflict prevention will all be handled “in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter” (TFEU 2012: Section 2, Art. 42.1). Due to the 
gradual development of the EU, as well as its transformations through time, the EU “shall 
respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” (TFEU 2012: Section 2, Art. 42.2). So while having 
established their own security and defence framework, they do take both the UN and NATO 
into consideration.  
It seems, that while there is indeed development within the EU in terms of external security 
and defence within its treaties, and has been for decades, it still seems to be lacking. It was 
agreed that the EU “requires a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military 
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capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies“(Cologne European Council 1999: 1). 
Despite wanting an capacity for autonomous action, the treaties of the EU dictate that 
“Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the 
implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives 
defined by the Council“ (TFEU 2012: Section 2, Art 42.3). So the intention or goal rather is for 
the EU to be able to take their own action within the field of external security and defence 
autonomously. However their own structure means that the EU has to have consensus within 
the Council in order to be able to launch a mission or operation. It is also the case that the EU 
does not have a standing army itself, which means that it, is up to the separate Member States 
to lend the EU its troops, personnel or equipment.       
	  
6.1	  Capabilities	  of	  the	  EU	  
When looking at the hard facts, the European Union can be considered a strong power. 
However there are other things that need to be taken into consideration. Although their 
economical capabilities are among the largest in the world, it is debateable if those economical 
capabilities are actually the capabilities of the EU. The total economy of the EU is of course 
the sum of its Member States economies, and considering the fact that each Member State still 
has control over their own economy, the question of economic capabilities can be questioned. 
Of course if the European Union one day would become single state it would be a very strong 
actor. Furthermore the actual money which the EU themselves have at their disposal, are paid 
by the Member State. Roughly said, the EU without the direct support of their member states, 
the EU has no money for their livelihood.     
Because of the high standards and strict rules on symbolic issues, such as human rights, rule of 
law etc. the EU’s judgment and opinions can be considered valuable. For instance in the case 
we have mentioned with Kosovo. The diplomatic power of the EU is manifested through the 
initiative of the High Representative, and her role which resembles that of a foreign minister 
for the EU, making her the representative for the 27 Member States. A problem here is that 
Member States are still acting individually on the global scene, with each their own foreign 
minister despite, certain similarities accounted for in the CFSP. The overall problem here 
which could be considered would be that unlike many other organisations or states, the EU and 
specifically the CFSP is still a very young actor on the international scene, which has only 
existed since 1992, marking their entrance into the international scene.     
Patrick	  Schack	  &	  Mads	  Blankenburg	   	   	  43	  
As we have outlined through the project, the EU has a close collaboration and alliance with 
NATO. With NATO being a consortium concerned with security, defence and military actions, 
their perception of power may be distorted or at least influenced towards the harder powers. 
Earlier this year, the Head of NATO, Ander Fogh Rasmussen gave a speech for the MEPs on 
the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee. This speech was regarding the EU foreign 
policy. In this speech he said that “we Europeans must understand that soft power alone is 
really no power at all. Without hard capabilities to back up its diplomacy, Europe will lack 
credibility and influence," (Rettman A 2013). By this he clearly shows that he does not believe 
in solely soft power. Of course he does not neglect the importance of strong diplomacy or soft 
powers in general, but he does say directly that to have soft power, you need to have hard 
power. Basically he means that "If European nations do not make a firm commitment to invest 
in security and defence, then all talk about a strengthened European defence and security 
policy will just be hot air," (Rettman A 2013). As we discussed earlier although the military 
force of the EU looks significant it still lacks "transport planes, air-to-air refuelling and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets” (Rettman A 2013). Prior to this speech 
he was attending the annual conference on trans-Atlantic security in Munich earlier this year. 
Here he pointed out the fact that in the Mali mission the US had to “provide Intelligence 
Surveillance Reconnaissance assets, they have had to provide air-to-air refuelling tankers for 
jets," (Rettman B 2013). What is to be deduced from his statements are that the European 
Union does not hold the military capabilities to conduct some of these missions, since they 
have to rely on US assistance. As mentioned the EU is part of the US-dominated alliance, and 
therefore the US and NATO of course has an agenda, in the sense that, when the EU weakens, 
the alliance weakens overall.  
The military capabilities of the EU are on paper are very strong, consisting of an active military 
personnel of about 1.6 million. The obstacle here is however, that the EU does not have a 
standing army under their command. The military is spread across the member states. Of 
course the member states are obliged to supply the EU with a certain amount of personnel or 
equipment within 60 days “Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities 
available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence 
policy”(TFEU 2012: Section 2, Art. 42.3). However the main point is that these forces are still 
bound to the member states, which are still sovereign. Another problem with their military 
capabilities is that they do not have the capacity to project their military power over longer 
distances like the USA, or other great powers have, with their aircraft carriers and alike. 
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Actually some of the member states possess greater means for projecting their power on their 
own, for instance Italy, France and UK has active aircraft carriers (BBC 2012). The European 
Union has even pressed for the capabilities an aircraft carrier could provide in the Headline 
Goal 2010 (2004) where one of the milestones is “the availability of an aircraft carrier with its 
associated air wing and escort” (Headline Goals 2010: Art. A, 5.F). These capabilities are 
however not included in the agreements with the EU. 
 
While the European Union has been engaged in several operations through the past couple of 
years, there also certain operations that it, as a supranational entity with its own military 
framework (dependent, though it is, on its Member States), has not taken part of. In the case of 
Libya, the European Union Member States could not agree on what course of action should be 
taken in regards to General Gaddafi (Allen and Smith  2012: 165). There were several 
problems in trying to get the European Union to react with military force, one of which was 
that the two battle groups that were on active duty during the conflict, One was apparently of 
Dutch-German constellation and the other was of a Swedish-Finnish constellation, and these 
four countries where not advocates for armed involvement in the Libya conflict (Allen and 
Smith 2012: 165). In the end, United Nations-mandated NATO actions helped play a role in 
the Libya Conflict, but Allen and Smith (2012) point out that while the NATO operations did 
indeed influence the outcome, Germany alongside China and Russia abstained from voting 
within the United Nations Security Council resolution. In the end Allen and Smith (2012) 
suggests that bilateral military relationships might work better for the European Union Member 
States. Despite these suggestions, its emphasized that the both the United Kingdom and France 
has an interest in seeing activity within the European Union defence, the United Kingdom, in 
order to reassure the United States of America, and France in order to have an alternative to 
NATO (Allen and Smith 2012: 165). The European Union external security and defence aspect 
is ended with Allen and Smith noting that “EU’s pretensions to act as an independent global 
power were once again cruelly exposed” (Allen and Smith 2012: 165). In a Guardian article of 
2011 (Traynor 2011), it is noted that not only did the participating European forces run out of 
munitions after only 11 weeks, but that in relations to the NATO action itself, less than half of 
the NATO members were actually willing to participate, end even then, less than a third where 
participating in the strike missions (Traynor 2011). Furthermore “The US share of Nato 
military spending had soared to 75%, much more than during the cold war heyday when 
Washington maintained hundreds of thousands of US troops across Europe, he said. The US 
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public would not stand for this much longer” it was reported said by Robert Gates, former US 
defence secretary (Traynor 2011). 
It seems paradoxical that the European Union seems to want to step up to greater responsibility 
within international security. Even going so far as creating the role of High Representative, and 
defence policies that are to create a framework for intervention and international security, but 
when a United Nations-mandated operations is opened, not only did they not want to react 
collectively as the European Union, but instead with bilateral agreements and through NATO. 
As mentioned in the Guardian article (Traynor 2011) it is even noted that European defence 
spending is falling, and that the expectation is not for it to rise again. So despite their external 
security and defence developments, it is indicated that there does not seem to be the will or 
economy to follow through on the international security goals. Furthermore, it has been 
mention earlier that it is a potential complication to have the European Union’s armed forces 
not actually be theirs, but simply a lending agreement with its Member States. A further 
complication was noted above, in that it was hinted that the countries supplying the troops for 
the European Union, such as in the battlegroups, also have a say in the circumstances of their 
deployment.    
It is written in the Headline Goal 2010, that “The availability of effective instruments including 
military assets will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development 
and/or in the post conflict phase” (Headline Goal 2010: 1). Despite this goal of availability it 
was quoted by Ian Traynor (2011), that Robert Gates had been upset that in the case of Libya, 
the European forces (not the European Union forces, mind you) ran out of munitions in a 
conflict that was overall deemed minor. It was a small country, with a small population and an 
inferior military, but despite this, the European forces6 could not deal with the conflict alone, 
and required the United States of America to step in, despite their preferred back-seat role 
(Traynor 2011). While the United Kingdom and France in this conflict, did not represent the 
European Union directly, and as such not the Headline Goal 2010, it is despite that noticeable 
that the two largest European Union military powers did not have the munitions for this 
conflict, without United States assistance. It is stated within the European Security Strategy of 
2003, that “The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a 
military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its 
own” (European Security Strategy 2003: 1). One could argue that this explains the above, on 
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why the United Kingdom and France required assistance from the United States. However, the 
problem is that this is part of the European Security Strategy, meaning it is written by and for 
the European Union, but the European Union were not the ones to directly offer any aid; 
instead it had to come from separate Member States through bilateral or multilateral action 
through NATO. So “The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility 
for global security” (Headline Goal 2010: 1), they acknowledge that the United States on their 
own cannot handle that responsibility, but despite this, and even with development within the 
European Union’s field of external security and defence, there was still not offered any 
European Union military action or direct cooperation. In the end it had to be bilateral or 
multilateral action on the part of separate Member States, but outside of the European Union 
framework, something that the European Security Strategy acknowledges is not playing to the 
their strength:   
 “The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and 
Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together” (European Security Strategy: 
13).                
As we pointed out the EU can be seen as a small power, due to their focus on only regional or 
geographically close issues and conflicts. Another indicator hereof is that they simply do not 
possess the capabilities for projecting their power further. A thing which does come to mind 
when discussing this is however, most of the issues which requires the attention of the 
international scene, are centred around the EU, Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The 
discussion is then, are their actions a defensive manoeuvre to secure themselves, or an attempt 
to get more involved in global security issues.                        
The initiatives taken by the EU and the creation of new areas with for instance the CSDP, the 
discussion of whether the Union is trying to balance power, has emerged. The initiatives which 
are clearly with the motivation to generate military capabilities can be seen as an internal 
balancing. What is important to remember is that although the EU does not perceive, for 
instance, the US as a potential threat, it can still be seen as balancing (Howorth 2009). 
However with these new initiatives the EU is also trying to increase its autonomy from actors 
such as NATO and the US. They are doing so because they want to be able to act without their 
meddling. As we have showed, they have built up capabilities relating manpower, to challenge 
and surpass the US; however they are lacking on most of the other fronts, funding, equipment 
and heavy machinery. The EU is not  yet in the league with great powers like USA, China and 
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Russia as it is restricted by the fact that it is still just an organisation composed by sovereign 
states not only limited by capabilities, but first and foremost the actual willingness by the 
member states. Of course it should be emphasised that the EU has not explicitly expressed 
intentions to become a great power.   
In terms of our working question, it would seem to indicate what while there has been 
development within the EU in the sphere of external security and defence, even significant 
development, it has been able to change the global role of the EU. However, with the 
restrictions it is put under, both in terms of Council consensus, and having no standing army of 
its own, the goal of autonomous action seems tenuous. So while the global role of the EU has 
definitively changed, the question is, to what degree.     
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7.	  Conclusion	  
The European Union has gone through several transformations since its time of inception in 
1952, finally ending in with the Lisbon Treaty. With the Lisbon Treaty, the work starting a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as a Common Security and Defence Policy were 
continued, as was the role of the High Representative from the Amsterdam Treaty. The result is 
a High Representative with an agency of its own, the European External Action Service, under 
which several other agencies and institutes are assigned.  
This development has meant that the European Union now has a security and defence 
framework, independent of NATO or the UN, despite cooperation. Within this framework, 
there are procedures for how to gather troops, and who can initiate missions and operations, as 
well as ensuring a mutual defence clause. 
While the European Union has experienced a progressive development in terms of its external 
security and defence capabilities, it still faces problems as an autonomous external actor. The 
Council of the European Union needs to decide unanimously in order to initiate a mission or 
operation, and as such, every single member of the Council of the European Union has a de-
facto power of veto. Another challenge, is that the European Union in itself is not afforded an 
army anywhere in the treaties, which means, that in order to engage in a mission, it has to call 
up the troops to be utilized from its Member States. It could be argued that these two facts are 
not particularly conductive to the goal of autonomous European Union action. 
The extent of the operations and missions of the European Union, as well as the location of 
these can be viewed as the European Union being a small military power, and that as a small 
power, it has no real global reach, but is instead more of a regional power. 
The military capacity of the European Union also indicated that despite its wish or goal as an 
actor within international security, it does not seem to have the direct capacity to have a true 
global reach. 
The European Union has expressed the wish or goal of being an autonomous international 
security actor and it has gone through significant developments during the past couple of 
decades, moving from a coal and steel community, to a greater economic community that 
culminated in an actual European Union. These developments have indeed changed the global 
role of the European Union, as they have proved being able to carry out missions, both civilian 
and military through a number of years. The limited scope of those very missions as well as the 
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challenges it faces with a required consensus in the Council of the European Union and its goal 
for autonomous action, along with not having its own armed forces, and instead being required 
to lend from Member States for every mission, means that while the global role of the 
European Union has indeed changed, its change or development within the sphere of external 
security and defence has only affected its global role to a lesser extent. That being said, its 
development within the external security and defence framework along with the potential from 
its Member States, means that there is definitively room to grow. 
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8.	  Afterthoughts	  
	  
Whenever writing a project that is inherently within a deadline and limited funds, there will 
always be considerations or concerns for how the project could have optimally looked. The 
data that we have used throughout the project has mainly been from official EU sources, such 
as the EU treaties or published journals from the European Union’s Institute for Security 
Studies. An alternative source of data could have been from interviews, and within the field or 
sphere that we have done project on, there are a lot of people who could have some interesting 
input, and from many institutions within the EU. First and foremost, the Council of the 
European Union and the High Representatives office, as they make the majority of decisions 
regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the Common Security and 
Defence Policy. Regardless of its actual feasibility, the European Council could also be 
interesting, as they are responsible for setting the overall strategy of the EU. While the civilian 
part of the EU could be very interesting to interview on the question of external security and 
defence, it might be even more beneficial to interview some of the military officials involved 
with the CFSP and the CSDP.   
Another perspective than what we have worked on, is the question of why the development 
came to be in the first place, and not just how it developed. To answer that, one could look at 
how the EU as a supranational entity has acted and how it has commented on the development 
or need for development within the external security and defence sphere, as opposed to the 
national levels of its Member States. Was the development pushed from a national level or 
from a supranational level? One could ask the question, on who seemed to show an interest in 
the EU having its own military capacities, and perhaps even why they had that interest.  
All of these considerations, or afterthoughts, have all been from an internal perspective, such as 
either the EU itself, or its Member States. However, these more internal considerations are not 
the only ones that could be interesting to look closer at. At the external level, it would also be 
very interesting to see how those not part of the EU have reacted to the creation of their 
military capacities and their official agenda. How has Russia reacted to a European Union with 
military capacities, and several operations and missions under its belt, and the same questions 
could be asked of the other countries or regions that are not part of the EU, or what is normally 
perceived as “the West”.  
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While we have primarily focused on power in terms of military, or security and defence it 
might also yield interesting results to look at the EU in its role as a civilian and normative 
power, as well as economic, as these are places that the EU have in recent times been ascribed 
recognition. In terms of the EU wanting to step into the global arena, it could be interesting to 
look at their capacities as a civilian, economic or normative power. 
A final afterthought could be looking at the EU Member States that are part of the United 
Nations Security Council, and how they have reacted to the creation of the CFSP and CSDP. 
Have they, as countries that are already permanently invested in international security, 
promoted this effort, or have they been hesitant in the creation of EU military capacities as well 
as its intention to provide assistance in matters of international security? 
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